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ABSTRACT:
This research explores two concurrent transition processes in the
regional economy of Franklin County and the neighboring town of
Athol. This semi-rural area, two hours northwest of Boston, was
once a world center for precision metalworking, renowned for its
skilled workforce. In recent years, employment levels in
metalworking have been declining; from 1980 to 1983, it is
estimated that 1400, or approximately one quarter, of the jobs in
metalworking have disappeared, many due to plant closings.
The first transition process I examine is the how the industry's
restructuring process has affected those metalworking firms that
remain in the area. I find that industries are experimenting with
a variety of strategies to retain their viability; these
strategies include new product development and marketing channels,
new technology in production processes, and/or new types of shop
floor relations with their workforce. While the outcome of this
experimentation is not predictable, it does appear that many firms
are drifting toward some aspects of a flexible specialization
strategy.
The second transition process I examine is the evolution of a
labor-initiated economic development planning project, the Machine
Trades Action Project. This project aimed to generate skilled
replacement jobs for dislocated workers from metalworking trades
It also aimed to create a public forum where managers, workers,
and public sector representatives could engage in long term
planning for the region. In two years, its focus has shifted from
working to recruit new firms into the area, toward working to
strengthen local firms through a flexible specialization strategy.
While many metalworking firms and the MTAP project are
experimenting with the same strategies, their activities are not
well coordinated. Additionally, the labor force that initiated
the MTAP project is, on the whole, not well integrated into
current project activities. This thesis both examines the reasons
for this lack of cohesiveness and presents recommendations to
address these issues.
Thesis Supervisor: Charles F. Sabel
Associate Professor in Social Science
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"There's nothing constant in the universe,
All ebb and flow, and every shape that's born,
Bears in its womb the seeds of change."
-Ovid
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I. INTF:QDUCT IOIN
The MTAP Prcn~iect
The summer of 1983 was a time of great uncertainty for
the metalworking industries of the rural Franklin County/Athol
region of Massachusetts. Although this area had once been a 6
worldwide center of metalworking, employment levels were
declining in most of the region's cutting tool plants, and a
major plant in Athol was about to close in the wake of a 6
protracted strike. When the largest cutting tool plant in
Greenfield became paralyzed by its own strike, the local union
(United Electrical Workers), representing many of the affected 6
workers, sponsored a meeting to discuss alternative responses
to the dramatic signals of decline. The union hall that night
swelled with mixed emotions of anger and fear, as individuals
described their own work situation in plants across the
industry. As one worker recalls, "I was mad and angry. . . I
got to hollerin' about what was happening at Bendix (another
local plant that had been put up for sale by its corporate
owners] and wonderin' what the 'powers that be' in town would
do." The accumulation of stories generated a realization that 0
a comprehensive approach to economic development with a new
direction was needed, and this meeting ignited a spark that
created an innovative planning project in the region. This
project, the Machine Trades Action Project (MTAP), and the
regional economy in which it operates, is the subject of this
thesis. 6
From its beginning as an idea articulated by the local
union and a group of community leaders, through its
development as a program with the early involvement and key
support of several state agencies, to its emergence as a pilot
project for state use of federal job training funds, MTAP
represents an important public sector experiment to rebuild a
mature industrial base. The organization will be described in
more detail at a later point. As with most experiments, the
focus has not only sharpened, but also shifted as the project
developed. The shifting of goals within MTAP represents in a
microcosm two polar approaches to economic development. These
two approaches, recruiting growth from outside the region vs.
generating growth from within the existing regional economy.
are currently at the center of debate in regional development
theory (see Gore, 1984).
The original goal, for what was first called the
"Employment Generating Project," was to attract new job
opportunities for dislocated machine trades workers, either
through relocation of companies from other places or new
business start ups, by marketing the skills of the workforce.
While this focus on skills, and the creation of quality (good
paying and stable)jobs, was an innovative feature, the search
for those jobs was largely directed at attracting outside
investment. One worker described the strategy as "finding
expanding companies that have quality jobs and getting them to
expand up here." Two key activities were a skills survey of
dislocated workers, and the subsequent production of a
marketing brochure to be used by MTAP and other local
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institutions like the Charber of Corfmerce. The di f ference
between this initial strategy and conventional "smokestack
chasing" approaches to economic development is that "skills",
rather than a "good business climate" (with its low wages, low
taxes, etc) were marketed as the comparative advantage.
According to notes from an early planning meeting, this
strategy to attract outside investment was adopted because
"for the majority of displaced workers, there will be few new
job opportunities developed from within the existing
industries."
Yet now, nearly two years after MTAP was first funded,
the major program activities focus precisely on strengthening
existing industries, to build economic development from within
the region. The current MTAP strategy has three elements.
First, marketing the skills of the workforce continues, but
with a new focus; the goal is now to attract subcontracts for
existing firms rather than to induce the physical relocation
of a new plant. Second, MTAP is continuing to support
entrepreneurship; currently, staff is seeking funding to
develop a small business incubator facility. Third, MTAP is
working with existing metalworking firms to help them develop
new products. All of these strategies are also intended to
create high skilled, quality jobs, by helping the firms in
which many of these jobs currently exist to expand
incrementally.
Along with this transformation in strategy, the structure
of the MTAP organization has changed. From a labor-dominated
committee based planning forum to generate skilled employment
opportunities, MTAP has evolved, in many respects, into a
provider of one-on-one consulting by staff to local businesses
seeking new market opportunities. The decision-making
structure and the strategies have changed, even as the
underlying goal of the project--the creation of high skilled
jobs which utilize the existing skills of dislocated machine
trade workers--has remained the same.
In part, my thesis will explore why these shifts
occurred, in strategy and structure, and what have been the
concrete outcomes that resulted from MTAP's experimentation.
Thus, I am conducting a project evaluation to assist in the
planning of other similar projects. Additionally, however, my
thesis will explore the implications of the new program
direction for this particular region, this particular set of
industries, this particular labor force, and the MTAP project
at its current stage in development. From this analysis, I
make recommendations for the future of MTAP, based on trends
observed within the regional economy. How are firms within the
metalworking industries addressing their need to remain
competitive, innovate, and make money? How are workers, and
the union, addressing their need for quality jobs and control
over the stability of those jobs? How is the local public
sector reacting to decline in the traditional manufacturng
base? Can and should a project like MTAP have a role in
strengthening, coordinating or initiating particular
activities?
My methodology for this investigation consisted of
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interviews with over forty people who have beeni involved tc
some extent with the MTAP project. I spoke with MTAP staff
people and Board members, staff of supporting State agencies,
local labor representatives, plant managers, company
presidents, and local public/non-profit sector people in the
Franklin County/Athol region. Although I utilized a very
loose format in the interviews, I rooted my questioning in a
model of economic development, based on the expansion of
existing firms, for which a skilled workforce is a key
element. This model, advanced by Piore and Sabel (1985) as
economic development based on "flexible specialization" is
useful because it draws on case studies of regions that have
some similarities with Franklin County, and because it is
being formalized by the MTAP project director as the model
towards which MTAP is building. It has not been my intent to
prove or disprove the validity of this model, but rather to
use the model to identify aspects of the regional economy
where one might find evidence of a transition process.
The Flexible SR2gialization Model
Drawing on the experiences of thriving regional economies
dominated by mature industry firms, the flexible
specialization model describes a process of local economic
restructuring in response to economic decline. In this model,
as individual firms experiment with new strategies for
survival and revitalization, they seek flexibility in their
production processes, specialization in their product markets,
and increase their interaction with other local firms.
Generally, like Franklin County, the regional economies
are locations of historic concentrations in a particular
industry, and are dominated by small firms, which rely on a
skilled workforce. Case studies of textiles in northern Italy
(Contarino, 1984), machine tools in southern Germany (Piore
and Sabel), and machine tools in rural Japan (Friedman, 1996),
depict a process of evolution from experimentation to
conscious strategic planning in a fundamentally new direction.
The emerging orientation toward flexible specialization moves
firms away from competition based on product price, and toward
competition based on product quality and innovation.
These changes occur because the market is characterized
as moving increasingly away from standardized demand for
standard output, and toward a more diverse and specialized set
of goods. There are several reasons for this change: a)
rising aggregate income creates a more diverse demand for a
wider variety of, and better quality product, and b) increased
pace of technological change in production processes (a
speeded up product life cycle), also creates a more diverse
demand (Sabel, 1979).
In order to meet diverse and shifting demands, a
successful firm continuously develops new products, and
produces that diverse range of products with a limited range
of equipment. The shifting from one product to another
requires flexibility in both the deployment of labor and the
application of capital equipment. Workers must be skilled to
operate a number of machines, to make judgements about the
appropriateness of particular production processes for a new
product, and to work quickly so that the custom product can be
quickly delivered to the buyer. The search for flexibility and
product specialization can mean new forms of shop floor
relations, new types of production technology, and the
exploration of new agglomeration economies among firms in the
region.
Although flexible specialization is a descriptive model
of a regional economic transition process, MTAP is exploring
its application as a prescriptive model; that is, a blueprint
for development that has the potential to generate high skill
jobs. For projects of MTAP's scale, focusing on a small
region, it is an attractive model because it offers local
handles for fundamentally affecting economic development;
the nature of inter-firm relations within a limited geographic
area, and nature of industrial relations within firms, and the
role of local third-party intervention to mediate and
coordinate development.
The Interaction
On the one hand, there seems to be a fit between MTAP's
strategy and the behavior of local metalworking firms. It
does appear that most firms are already incorporating at least
some elements of flexible specialization into their planning
for the future. MTAP can build on existing patterns of
business behavior. On the other hand, many workers who were
involved in setting up MTAP do not have confidence in the
flexible specialization approach as an adequate job generation
strategy, and they are wary about how increasing flexibility
will affect them in the long run. For example, they now must
work with and rely on, primarily non-union firms as the source
of new jobs, a strategy with which they are uncomfortable.
Some workers expressed their frustration in MTAP's "losing its
focus." The MTAP staff recognize the irony of a labor-
initiated project which has little active labor involvment in
the implementation process, and the danger that a flexible
specialization strategy shaped by business interests alone may
be less likely to generate high-skill jobs.
Flexible specialization implies an increased
interdependence of interests between business and labor within
a particular region; but a long history of adversarial
relations in Franklin County makes it difficult for either
group to make cooperation work, even around a limited set of
issues. Whatever inroads of cooperation that can be
established must coexist with collective bargaining. The
development of working alliances between constituencies that
have some conflicting and some converging interests poses a
critical challenge for public policy.
Right now, MTAP and the regional economy are at a
critical juncture point. MTAP has achieved both concrete and
less tangible successes in its two year existence, which will
be explored in this paper. Parallel to this public sector
effort, the private business sector is also experimenting with
a range of strategies that seem to be drifting toward MTAPs
goals. Finally, despite organized labor's misgivings about the
flexible specialization strategy, some individuals are trying
to creatively carve out a role for workers in this unfamiliar
"deveIopment from within" model. There is potential for
convergence in the goals, or at least some goals, of MTAP,
businessand labor, but such convergence is not inevitable.
Although MTAP's budget is to be phased out by the state
in August 1986, many strategic choices are pending for local
businesses and labor. There are very specific ways in which
sustaining a program like MTAP could help shape the outcomes
of these choices, by reintegrating labor into the planning
process, and by helping firms adopt a kind of flexible
specialization that can, in the long run, bring high-skilled
jobs to Franklin County.
This paper is organized into three remaining sections.
In Part II, I examine the conditions in the local metalworking
industries, and comparisons and contrasts with industry wide
trends. What are firms trying to do, and why: where are they
being successful, and where are they encountering bottlenecks?
In Part III, I examine the development of the MTAP project,
the transition in strategy toward flexible specialization, and
what shaped the participation of labor, business, and public
officials. As well, I review the outcomes of the MTAP project.
Finally, Part IV contains recomendations, both about changes
that might help future projects similar to MTAP, and about the
future of the MTAP project from where it currently stands.
II. THE METALWORKING INDUSTRIES: PLANNING FOR THE FUTURE
Overview
Because MTAP is now focusing on generating skilled jobs
by strengthening existing Franklin County businesses, an
understanding of how local firms are planning for the future
is critical. The successful implementation of MTAP strategies
to promote, for example, product diversification and increase
subcontracting business within these firms, requires knowledge
about if, how, and why firms are currently engaging in these
activities, where they are being successful, and where they
face bottlenecks.
This section will explore the variety of strategies that
local firms are employing. I interviewed company presidents
and plant managers across a range of small, medium and large
firms (thirteen firms in all)-- the largest employed
approximately four hundred people and the smallest a one
person shop-- manufacturing for both growing and declining
markets. Five of the thirteen plants had unions: four U.E.
shops and one I.A.M. (International Association of Machinists)
shop.The variation I encountered in terms of approach to new
product development, agglomeration, and flexibility, seems not
so much to be a function of whether the company heads are
progressive vs. backward. Rather, the variation seems to be a
function of the different market positions, existing plant
capacity, and existing labor arrangements of each firm. While
it is not clear in some cases whether firms are adopting these
new strategies as short run responses to decline , or whether
they are moving toDward the adoption of flexible zpecialiZation
as a permanent -change, it is clear that firms are
experimenting.
These findings are organized around the three major
elements of flexible specialization; (1) new product
development and product mix; (2) agglomeration economies
associated with the Franklin County location; and (3)
flexibility in production process, both in terms of labor and
equipment. But first, it is useful to get a sense of the whole
variety of activities that fall into the category of
metalworking industries.
The Industr
The metalworking industries of Franklin County/Athol
utilize a wide range of capital equipment and production
processes, and manufacture a wide range of products for
diverse markets. There are few direct competitors in the
region. Not only are the types of capital equipment diverse,
e.g. lathes, presses, drop forges, screw machines, etc, but
also the age of the equipment currently in use spans nearly a
century. While one company is phasing out some equipment with
an 1898 patent for 1960's machines, another company operates
1920's patent machinery, as others introduce state-of-the-art
CNC (computer numerically controlled)technology. Within one
company, there is always a variety of machine types, and often
a significant range of equipment age. Across firms, many of
the same machine types are in use and hence, the particular
skills of many workers are transferable from one plant to
another, despite all the diversity.
The products range from carbide inserts, triangular
cutting tools barely a quarter inch long, to nine foot square
cast iron sluice gates that control the flow of water over
dams; from consumer goods like barbecque tools and chef's
knives, to industrial machinery that grinds wood into pulp for
papermaking. Markets, while generally industrial rather than
consumer oriented, range from chain hardware stores to machine
tool companies, aerospace manufacturers to municipalities.
Within industrial markets, there are a range of end-
users. For example, firms can manufacture a piece for use in
metalworking, a cutting tool, such as a drill; or they can
manufacture a machine tool, the fixed piece of equipment that
uses cutting tools to cut metal, for example, a screw machine.
Firms also produce equipment that will be used in non-metal
manufacture, for example, the paper mill machinery, or a piece
that is one component of a larger piece of equipment, either
for manufacturing or for some other industrial use, such as a
spray nozzle for pollution control equipment.
Within each category, the products can range from being
"standards," a commonly used piece like a standard screw,
"specials," a custom-made piece that requires some
modification of the standard (e.g. an extra long drill),or a
one-of a kind piece (i.e. a cast metal housing for a prototype
machine).
Cutting tools, both standards and specials, have
traditionally formed the core of metalworking industries in
Franklin County. Since 1980, however, it is estimated that
1400 machine trade jobs have disappeared (Gaines, 1985),
representing one quarter of the workforce in this industry.
Most of these jobs have been lost to plant closings in the
cutting tool industry. There are still, however, a number of
cutting tool manufacturers in Franklin County, and to some
extent, they have been able to tap some growing markets.
There is a declining national market for cutting tools
for a number of reasons. First, because cutting tools
increasingly last longer, due to special coatings, superhard
metals, or ceramics in place of metals, the demand for
periodic replacements is reduced. Second, the metal cutting
function is not a key part of many new manufacturing
operations, because plastic has replaced metal in the end
products, and the new production process uses primarily molds
to form the products. Third, new tools for cutting metal,
such as lasers, are receiving increased use. And fourth,
import penetration for both inexpensive and top-of-the-line
tools, especially standards, is reducing the demand for
domestic cutting tools.
Yet, as markets for standards are shrinking, more
specials are needed. The rapid pace of technological change
has created a demand for new products. In recent years,
according to the Cutting Tool Manufacturers Association,
specials have expanded to represent close to half of the
cutting tool market. Some Franklin County cutting tool firms
have always concentrated on specials to some extent, and many
others are now moving toward increasing their production of
specials. In such markets, they have a comparative advantage
because they have a skilled workforce. For example, one firrm
that makes broaches, cutting tools which cut irregularly
shaped holes, has been working with its customers to design
and produce customized variations. Another firm is broadening
its product lines of hand tools to include more unusual sizes.
As well, firms are experimenting with other revitalization
strategies; new production technologies and shop floor
innovations. Thus, within an industry which in aggregate is
declining, local firms are rebuilding, and even within firms
that appear to be declining, often sales of certain product
lines are growing.
Certainly, a number of investors feel that the Franklin
County cutting tool industry is viable. In the early 1960's,
many of the independent locally owned firms in the area were
bought up by large corporations seeking to diversify their
holdings. Several of these corporations-- Litton Industries,
Allied Bendix, and Ingersoll Rand-- proceeded to divest
themselves of cutting tool divisions in the early 1980's. In
some cases, corporate ownership has meant a shrinkage of
product lines, and a lack of reinvestment in capital
equipment, leaving area firms less competitive after the
corporate divestiture (Mature Industries report, 1984).
Despite all of these problems, new investment has followed in
the wake of corporate disinvestment, although the number of
jobs remains far below even the lowest level of employment
before the change in ownership. Two companies, Bendix/Besley
ProCducts Co, a Ingersoll-Rand/Rul e, were bought by smaller
corporations who run the plants at reduced capacity. The
third case is a new company, Athol Cutter and Carbide, started
by a manager (and former machine operator) who had worked at
the Union Butterfield Plant. This company took on U.B.'s
product lines, but located in a different building. A fourth
corporation, TRW, which owns Greenfield Tap and Die, has just
put its cutting tool division up for sale.
Firms can locate business opportunities both within
growing markets and with specialized niches in stable or
declining markets. And, in fact, Franklin County firms are
doing both.
Product Spec ializat ion and Produict Diversi fication
Many diverse businesses strategies can be characterized
by product specialization: this simply refers to the fact that
the firms manufacture a narrow range of products, even if
these products are bought by diverse end users. Product
specialization within a flexible specialization strategy
generally focuses on the category of "specials," characterized
by short production runs. A company maintains its ability to
survive on short production runs by continuously developing
new products, and diversifying its product line. Marketing
strategies very much influence a company's ability, and
willingness to experiment with new product lines.
A main source of growth is making a "new and improved"
version of a current product, and less frequently, an
accessory part for their existing product; for example, one
local company has grown by developing a nurmbc-r of nozzles with
various applications, with each new model generally a slight
variation on the old. The source of ideas is as much from the
customer as it is developed internally. When marketing is
closely coupled with direct customer-supplier interaction,
ventures into product diversification, or product improvement,
are a much less risky proposition for the supplying
manufacturer, because the customer has already been
identified.
Some companies in expanding specialized markets, however,
had difficulty obtaining enough money and technical assistance
to develop the product. For example, managers at the paper
pulp riachinery company have identified a market for a new
computerized and energy efficient version of their
product,through contact with their existing customers, but do
not have the internal resources to bring the new product into
production. The market is known, but the cost of product
development is high.
Where does a trend toward specialization in growing
markets leave firms that currently manufacture for declining,
or at best stable markets? Their inability to identify a
market for new products constrains new product development.
In part, this results from the institutional arrangement of
marketing, the industrial distribution network. There are
signs of change in the workings of these networks.
Most of such firms have, in the past, relied on a network
of industrial distributors, wholesale suppliers of a range of
goods to other industries, to market thei r products. Thi s
eliminated the need for a firm to pay for the overhead of a
large sales staff combing the market for opportunities, and
was convenient for the purchasing firms to buy a diversity of
products from one source. The industrial distributor, rather
than the supplying manufacturer, establishes and maintains
contact with the customer.
In contrast, firms in expanding specialized markets,
while still in many cases relying on industrial distributors
to an extent, are more likely to be increasingly reliant on
direct sales (by the president and/or a small sales staff)
and manufacturers representatives, commissioned sales people
who market a number of non-competing product lines by
targeting particular industries and making sales calls. Those
firms that have adopted these marketing methods, whether
serving a diverse or narrow range of end users, make
specialized customized equipment where direct exchange of
information between customer and manufacturer is critical.
For firms in stable or declining markets, trying to
develop new products, both industrial distributors and
manufacturers are making adjustments, some toward increased
specialization in standardized goods with widespread
application in growing industries, others in becoming more
flexible, from both the manufacturer's and the distributor's
ends, to facilitate the transition to new market
opportunities, whether in growing or declining sectors. The
first approach is external market oriented, while the second
approach also takes into account the internal structure of the
marketing operation.
The first approach, since it is directed at a standard
good being produced with many competitors, implies a market
strategy that concentrates on lowering cost; as one industrial
distributor operating in this way told me, "No matter what you
hear about being able to sell price, quality,and servicethe
reality of the market is that it's price, price, and price."
This distributor is looking to fill the standardized product
needs of growing sectors, for example, by selling pliers to
high technology industries as well as traditional metalworking
customers. As he told me, "the volume is there. An order for
12 sets of pliers for a 'smokestack' company would be a big
order. For hi-tech, 12 dozen sets is a common order." While
there may also be a concern for quality--for example, a
company president told me "we advertise that all of our pieces
are individually inspected by a human being," the low profit
margins in a competitive standardized market dictate, at
least in this particular case, low wages, with a starting wage
of $3.75/hr, $5.00 for skilled workers.
Additionally this strategy implies a path for new product
development that is quite risky for the firm. One local
company that makes completely standardized products recently
developed a totally new product, a "ground thread screw
extractor," with innovative features for which the owner has a
patent pending. He views this particular tool as having
widespread applications across industries, as well as working
better than existing models on the market, and began marketing
it last fall with letters to his indutrial distribution
network. When the letter failed to elicit response, he began
personally visiting distributors with the tool, and has
received, he feels, a very positive response. While he is
confident that there is a growing untapped market for this
particular device, the road between his model'and that market
is certainly a winding one, the link between customer and
supplier uncertain during the product development stage. The
product is developed, and then aggressively marketed.
The second approach to marketing in declining industries
is to facilitate a location of the market opportunity first
(through distributor contacts), and adjust manufacturing and
distribution networks to deliver the good. This is done by
increasing the level of communication between customer and
supplier, with the distributor as intermediary.
For example, one company recently spent $25,000 on a
marketing brochure which they are giving to their distribution
network, illustrating and giving specifications of everything
they make. Several companies are increasing the use of in-
house sales representatives, who visit distributors to explain
the technical complexities of a given product, and are on-call
to visit customers with the distributor. The distributor
works with the manufacturer's sales staff, who are technical
specialists in their particular product lines, rather than
trying to train his own staff to know the intricacies of every
product. One distributor I spoke with is actively trying to
link up customers with supplying manufacturers, whether the
need is for a standard bulk order or a custom made piece-- in
other words, becoming more of a service and less of a volume
operator. The communication flows both ways; "we go to
suppliers and bring opportunities back from the customer" as
well as bringing supplier ideas to potential customers because
"the manufacturer may often be ahead of the distributor" in
identifying new product ideas.
Product diversification within this marketing strategy
results from the flow of ideas back and forth between customer
and supplier. If the distributor is aggressive about finding
new market opportunities, new product development is much less
risky for the supplying company. While a distribution network
could potentially hamper the ability of firms to adjust to
shifting markets, by interfering with customer/supplier
interaction, and may in fact be a contributing factor to why
some local firms have found themselves seemingly locked into
declining markets, the creative distributor can also be a
solution to the problem. A network of distributors across a
wide geographic area with contacts in a wide range of industry
sectors, backed up with technical expertise from the supplier,
could connect Franklin County firms with new customers whose
product needs, whether very related to old product lines or
entirely different, require the skilled workers and capital
equipment in a firm now facing market decline. While still
not an easy strategy, this approach does emphasize the
ferreting out of new markets as the critical step in new
product development. This approach also generally seens to
lend itself to the generation of market opportunities for
spe Cials, becaLse the product, at least initially, is designed-
around an individual customer's needs.
For companies in stable or declining markets, it seems
that the need is more for help with locating the new market--
while technical assistance and money may also be a problem,
these firms do not often get beyond the step of finding that
market. As one manager told me, "it's not just what I can do,
but what I can sell that's important", and another: "We've got
plenty of ideas; it's finding the market for them that's
difficult."
Aggjlmeration
Agglomeration economies are the benefits that accrue to a
business by virtue of its geographic location near other
businesses. The benefits of being located near other
businesses can fall into several categories; access to a
shared labor force, access to suppliers and production inputs,
infrastructure, and access to markets. The ability of firms to
move toward flexible specialization , according to the model,
depends on the existence of certain agglomeration economies,
most notably, the presence of a highly skilled and versatile
labor force. The ability of a region to sustain development
based on flexible specialization seems to depend on an
increasingly dense web of interdependence among a region's
firms--that is, the development of further agglomeration
economies.
Most prominent among agglomeration economies in Franklin
County is the existing labor force. The fact that metalworking
firms across the range of industries utilize some of the same
machinery types means that the sk:illed labor is also
versatile, with training that, in many cases, is not plant
specific. In one case, two metalworking firms and two other
local firms which perform some metalworking, put together a
joint training program with funding from the Bay State Skills
Corporation.
I found two other sorts of agglomeration economies. The
first has to do with the fact that metalworking is still
relatively concentrated in New England. Distributorships are
set up so that each distributor buys from a much larger region
than their selling area. A typical selling area can be a 50
mile radius around a metropolitan area, while a buying area
can be the whole country plus some foreign countries. One
Western Massachusetts distributor I spoke with said that he
buys ten percent of his products within the selling area, and
this, while typical for New England based distributors, was an
uncommonly high figure for distributors nationally. This is
because in New England, many suppliers of cutting tools are
located in the selling area, near the buyers.
This situation may explain why, even though the market
for cutting tools was declining nationally, firms in this area
have had a delayed response to the market decline. In New
England, there has been a relative abundance of customers, and
even now, companies are still able to make the kind of
informal contacts that allow them to find local market
opportunities. For example, a plant manager of a company that
makes almost exclusively standardized drills told me he is
very close to closing a 3/4 million dollar deal with a nearby
firm (outside of Franklin County) for a custom made wood
boring bit. While he generally relies on industrial
distributors, he made this contact by calling on the plant
manager cold.
This may be a mixed blessing. The ability to make local
deals brings short-term business, but may in the long term
inhibit firms in these declining industries from developing
more systematic marketing efforts. According to one
distributor, and contrary to other research (Mature Industries
Report, 1984), while geographic proximity between buyer and
seller is convenient and saves a little money in
transportation and communications costs, that proximity is not
the key factor in determining a firm's competitive advantage
for making specials, where the growth in the market seems to
be. "Delivery time", along with quality are the key
components for success in a specials market, and delivery
time has two parts- the in-house turnaround time during
manufacture, and the shipping time from supplier to buyer.
While turnaround time can vary six weeks or more, shipping
time generally varies no more than a few days. If this is
true, the manufacture of specials may be becoming, like
standards, increasingly independent of the location of end
users.
This seems to be borne out by the experiences of several
local firms. For example, a company which makes sluice gates
that control the flow of water and sewage, has a worldwide
market, even though each order is virtually custom made, one
of a kind, and, as large cast iron pieces, expensive to ship.
The company that makes spray nozzles for air pollution
equipment and other uses, to many different specifications,
likewise has a worldwide market. A new cutting tool company,
started by former managers from Union Butterfield,
manufactures specials almost exclusively, and sells them
nationally. This trend, if widespread for a number of
specialty products, is again a mixed blessing to Franklin
County firms. On the one hand, metalworking firms now may
have greater access to a worldwide market for its potential
products. On the. other hand, unless they can compete on in-
house turnaround time, local firms lose the comparative
advantage of being located near many end-users, and the
ability to strike substantive deals with other area firms.
Most specifically, this means that the work from the growing
markets of Eastern Massachusetts, while local, is not
necessarily especially accessible to western Mass. companies,
unless other factors are equal. This point deserves further
research.
The second agglomeration economy relates to the informal
networking, cooperation and small scale buying and selling
taking place between area firms, despite the diversity of
activites in the areas of product type, marketing strategies
and production technologies. For example, there seems to be
an active local secondary market for machine tools, in which
firms that upgrade to newer technology sell their old
equipment to other local firms. There does not seem to be an
active market for NC or CNC technology, at least yet. While
used machinery is also bought through industry wide trade
journal advertisements or regional auctions, a local
transaction comes with intimate knowledge of the particular
machine, with the old owner nearby to troubleshoot if
necessary. As well, several firms were able to buy equipment
as the bigger companies have been sold, moved, or shut down by
their conglomerate parents.
Several firms mentioned that they shared information
about various types and applications of technology; for
example, characteristics of Brand x grinder vs. brand y.
Firms exchange information about machines, particular
production techniques, and plant issues (e.g. a dust
collection system). A common vehicle for the exchange of such
information is that plant managers tour each other's plants
every once in a while. Neither the local Chamber of Commerce,
nor the industry trade associations really facilitated this
contact; firms perceived of the Chamber as retail oriented,
while the trade associations both encompasses larger regions
than Franklin County, and were very specialized e.g. a foundry
assoc i at i on.
Besides information, firms occasionally share actual
equipment. Several plant managers spoke of loaning out a
particular cutting tool or tool holder on a one time basis--
for example, a small firm borrowed a large drill that would
have cost them $300 to buy from the nearby manufacturer, for a
single operation. Further, companies sometimes borrow or lend
a piece of larger equipment or a machine tool, when either the
exchanging companies use exactly the sarme piece of equipment
(a flask for casting), or when companies have the same type
machine with different capacities (ie. size of piece), or when
one company has a specialized piece of equipment. Sometimes,
these exchanges mean that one firm sends its employee to the
other firm's site to work on the equipment there. One firm
sent its employee to do inspection of its pieces on a high
resolution magnifying glass owned by another company--the
first firm's own magnifying glass was smaller, and though it
suited most of its needs, was not precise enough for one
particular .job. In another case, an employee of one company
travelled to a nearby company with the same equipment to turn
out production there, due to lack of capacity at the first
plant.
Sometimes, all of these informal exchanges are free, or a
nominal fee is paid; in other cases, the arrangement takes the
form of a formal subcontract. It seems to depend on the nature
of the relationship between the firms' managers, and on how
frequently the operation is performed. Generally
subcontracting within the region, like the informal
arrangements, is sporadic. Most typically, a subcontract is
for a particular process, such as heat treating or grinding,
rather than for a wholly made part. There are instances of
companies making a spare part, or a specialized piece of
equipment for local use, but in each case, a subcontract is
not the first option pursued. In the case of a spare part,
firms are more likely to go back to the seller and get a
replacement, or borrow a part from another company with the
same machine. In the case of a specialized piece of equipment,
since many firms have their own machine shops, they can make
the piece in-house. However, sometimes, a firm that makes
large castings, for example, will subcontract out its small
castings needs, because either the precision needed for the
small piece is not achievable with their large casting
equipment, or because it is cheaper to have it done
externally. Finally, two local firms, I was told in
confidence, are in the planning stages for a joint venture,
with manufacturing divided between the two plants.
In reality, there's actually a lot more interfirm
purchasing than would be indicated by the subcontracting
activity. The fact that most firms both buy and sell cutting
tools through industrial distributors makes it hard to
determine the degree of formal interindustry linkage. While
some firms knew whether or not particular items they bought
were made locally (even if not purchased directly from the
local firm), many others just had no idea of the origins. Of
those which know, metalcutting firms tended to use more
locally made products than metal forging or metal casting
firms, because much of the equipment for the latter was not
manufactured in Franklin Country.
With respect to subcontracting in particular, but
interfirm "jobbing" in general, one company president stated
that when his company has excess capacity, it was more likely
to engage in various short term projects with other local
firms. As the company moves toward operation at full capacity,
it was actually less flexible, and less likely to be able to
accomodate the needs of others. In fact, many (but not all) of
the stories I heard about inter-firm cooperation were a couple
of years old, when plant closings and layoffs were epidemic.
This is somewhat contrary to the experience of the machine
tool industry of Sakaki Township (Friedman) in rural Japan,
where an intricate web of cooperative networks, including use
of another firm's machinery at that firm's site, enables each
firm to run at capacity. This may have to do with the fact
that metalworking production processes generally require some
machines which run quite regularly, and some which are used
infrequently for special operations, so that even as a firm
runs at full capacity, not all machines are in use at any
given moment. For those cooperative actions which require, at
some some phase, use of the busiest machines, then it makes
sense that as firms move toward full capacity, less
cooperation is possible. In Franklin County, most firms are
not at the point of having to worry about operating near full
capacity. At least two firms are looking to lease out space in
their buildings because of great excess capacity.
Although for any one firm, the amount of inter-firm
networking (formal and informal) is limited and sporadic, the
fact that virtually all the firms I spoke with had some
experience indicates that, as several firms mentioned, there
is commitment to being a "good neighbor" and an awareness of a
regional connection. These pinch-hitting kind of deals do tend
to give the involved firms more flexibility in meeting
contract deadlines. But the main source of experimentat ion
with increased flexibility is the shop floor, using new
production processes, new physical layouts, and new
relationships with the labor force.
FEixibility
Across the board, managers in Franklin County
metalworking firms are experimenting with increasing
flexibility in their production processes. Increased
flexibility can be achieved by changing the technology in use,
the physical organization of the plant, the tasks that workers
do, or the incentive structure for workers to provide input.
Increasing flexibility is controversial among workers,
because it has several purposes. On the one hand, flexibility
can increase the viability of the firm, and thus the stability
of jobs, by allowing it to implement the shorter production
runs that characterize specials, develop new products and/or
use more efficient production processes. On the other hand,
flexibility can be a tool for increasing profits that are not
reinvested in the plant, thereby not contributing to the
viability of the firm, and stability of jobs. For example,
shifting shop floor arrangements from a situation where each
worker runs one machine to a situation where each worker runs
a number of machines simultaneously or sequentially, can be
both a measure to improve turn-around time by increasing
worker discretion in scheduling his/her work, and a measure to
purely "speed-up" production. In this section, I will explore
flexibility from the point of view of managers; when I
describe the MTAP pro.ject and labor's feelings about the
flexible specialization focus, I will describe labor's
perspective.
For some, but not all firms, the introduction of new
technology is a critical ingredient for increasing
flexibility. Technologies in use range from hand fed
"conventional" machines which make one piece at a time and can
make a wide range of pieces, to "automatic" machines which
make a set of identical pieces from bar stock that is loaded
into the machine periodically by the operator and make a
limited range of pieces, to "computerized" (NC or CNC)
machines which combine the flexiblity of conventional machines
to make several types of pieces with the speed of automatic
machines. Computerized machines are programmed for their
operations. Managers make deliberate choices as to whether to
upgrade capital equipment, what level of technology to adopt,
and the specific application.
Six of the thirteen companies that I talked to either had
or were about to purchase NC (numerically controlled) or CNC
machine tools. The ability of a company to pay for technology
updating, has been of course, a limiting factor to the
adoption of these modern tools, as new CNC machines commonly
cost over $200,000; this consideration, however, was never the
first one that plant managers and company presidents cited.
The most common reason cited for adopting NC or CNC technology
was "cost effectiveness"; when a particular piece could be
made more quickly, and hence more cheaply, with an NC or CNC
machine. While several companies stated that the technology
would reduce labor costs, they did not anticipate, and had not
in the past needed, layoffs as a result of the new technology.
Increased sales resulted in more work to go around.
Related to cost effectiveness was "better quality", a
concept which has two different dimensions. The first concept
of quality refers to reducing the number of rejected pieces on
a production run of many standard parts. The second concept of
quality refers to more preciseness or ease in the making of
complex parts which on a conventional machine might require a
long series of precise operations with a very small margin for
error.
The following illustrate the two concepts of quality. In
one company, the most technologically advanced machines were
used to perform the most standardized operations, with the
intent of freeing up skilled morkers to improve turn-around
time on the production of customized specials, for which they
used conventional machines. In another company, on the verge
of purchasing CNC equipment, it was anticipated that the new
equipment would be especially useful in performing intricate
operations for prototype manufacture requiring a high degree
of precision. In yet another company, the CNC machines were
used for both speedy production of standard parts and
technically complex operations, running continuously through
two eight hour shifts.
It is difficult, at least with this sample of firms, to
systematize the relationship of CNC use with the mix of
specials vs. standards in the output, except to say that it
depends on the one hand, on the degree of precision required,
and on the other hand, on the degree of standardization
possible. In use for the production of a standard piece there
may be a threshold which determines whether a CNC or NC
machine is economical. A couple of managers mentioned that
they were not able to achieve the economies of scale necessary
to operate a NC or CNC machine. I suspect that the threshold
effect lies in operating costs vs. cost of overhead (the
purchase price); one plant manager who inherited a non-working
CNC machine from the old owners (hence, it had no overhead
cost because the machine was effectively paid for) stated that
"even if we could get the thing working [it presently has a
design problem], it still wouldn't be cost-effective to
operate." A final reason for experimenting with NC or CNC
technology was "to eliminate an irritant job," one with
particularly unpleasant working conditions. The company that
cited this reason had not, so far, been successful at doing
t h is.
I did not find any companies that explicitly introduced
new technology to "de-skill" employees and increase the scope
of management perogative. In fact, those companies that
introduced modern technology have done so mostly to take
advantage of worker skills. While other researchers have
found that new technology is often used to transform a
craftsperson into an operator by transferring program design
to engineers, leaving narrowed program execution to the shop
f I oor (Nob le, 1979), most Frankl i n Coutty firms train operators
to at least edit the machine's programs (i.e. troubleshoot),
and frequently, to design the actual program. The most common
system for determining which workers are trained is to choose,
at the minimum, that worker whose current function is changed
or eliminated by the new technology. When the displacement
effect is not clear, some companies have an open-bidding
process for training. Some unionized companies also introduce
seniority as an allocative mechanism, and offer training first
to the most senior employee. One reason that technology seems
not to be greatly associated with increasing management
control is because many firms in Franklin county are too small
to have large engineering staffs to get so intimately involved
in day to day operations on the shop floor. However, the
impact of technology on worker skills varies across firms.
One plant president perceived the new technology as
requiring a different mix of skills. Another told me that "if
anything, the new machines are easier to operate". An engineer
at one of the area's largest plants, however, expressed
reservations that the new technology did, in fact, bring about
a loss of skills and a loss of shop floor control over
production.
Strategic decisions by firms do not necessarily include
the purchase of state of the art capital equipment. There is a
distinct difference between equipment modernization and
adopting technologically advanced, automating equipment.
While it is true that most of the companies with growing
markets for their output have introduced new technology, it is
not clear that the wholesale introduction of new technology to
the production process of firms currently in declining mar kets
is so critical. Certainly, these firms are not, for the most
part, seeking out advanced technology on their own--ither
they say they don't need it for the operations they perform or
that they are "waiting until a new technology proves itself"
in other similar settings.
These firms are concentrating on increasing flexibility
by changing the organization of work in a number of other
ways. While increasing flexibility can, hypothetically, mean
increasing flexibility to lay people off, reduce wages, etc.,
those companies that were experimenting the most with
flexibility were doing so, at least in part, to avoid laying
people off.
For example, in both union and non-union firms, plant
managers are rearranging the physical layout of their plants
to facilitate both movement of materials and informal cross-
training of people within the same department i.e. forging,
machine shop. This co'mplements their ability to be flexible
by giving workers a broader range of skills so that needed
short term transfers from one job to another are feasible.
Two plants had explicit policies for crosstraining; both were
especially likely to do crosstraining when their plants had
excess capacity, as a means of keeping people busy, instead of
laying them off. Another company has eliminated their quality
control department, instead having each operator along the
production process, starting at the receiving dock, check the
piece before it moves on, and flagging any suspici1ous piece
for further investigation by an engineer.
While the union is commonly perceived as being a real
obstacle to flexibility on the shop floor, I found great
variation in the experiences of union plants, and found
evidence of movement toward more flexibility in all of the
union firms I interviewed, from the point of view of managers.
Two plants had very loose contracts without narrow job
classifications, and neither had had labor problems in a long
time. In a third plant, managers found the union accepting a
high number of "temporary transfers" to jobs outside their
contract obligations, that were not specifically prohibited by
the contract. The plant managers thought that the union was
not resisting these transfers because the workers knew that
there really was not enough work to go around. As one said,
"when we're running at undercapacity, the union is weak
because the company is weak." He anticipated that when the
company had more work, the union would begin protesting, or at
least, want more control over the structure of the transfer
policy, and was not sure what the outcome would be. Given the
good labor-management relations, he did not anticipate a
strike.
A fourth union plant gave more perogative to the
production worker as to the scheduling of that work. Although
the out of state parent corporation had instituted a highly
supervised "production control" system for prioritizing
orders, the plant manager has rejected this system as
inefficient. Instead of adhering to a schedule where each
piece is made in order of the date it is needed, the workers
on the shop floor make the decision about how to order their
work so that all pieces get out by the necessary date. This is
important, because metalcutting involves two broad operations;
setting up the machine with the proper tools, and then running
the metal through the machine to form the piece. Set-up is
time consuming and requires skill to properly specify the
dimensions of the piece; a set up represents down time for the
machine, and slows down production. By allowing a worker to
organize his/her own work according to the needed set up, and
to "batch" together like runs, fewer set ups are required, and
considerable time is saved.
Some of the firms experimenting with flexibility are also
seeking increased worker input to improve their operations.
There is a wide range of opinion on the role of the workforce
in suggesting process or product ideas. It is interesting that
the two most extreme views on the spectrum of opinion about
worker input come from non-union workplaces. One local
company president, when asked if he solicited worker input on
production process scheduling or product development, relayed
the following story. "When we moved the shipping clerk's
office to a new place, I sat down and asked her if she had any
suggestions for reorganizing the office. . . she had none," and
this surrmed up his attitude toward worker participation in
general.
At the other end of the spectrum, another company
actively solicits worker input even in the hiring of new
production workers, with a hiring procedure that included
letting the people (not not just supervisors) who would work
with the new person meet him/her and give feedback before the
hiring decision is made. Workers additionally were invited to
design, and paid to investigate, a safety program for the
plant. This same company has an explicit no layoff policy
which they believe encourages process innovation by production
workers that would not otherwise emerge. For example, at this
company, a worker made a cost-cutting suggestion that
eliminated the bulk of his job, and in a setting without the
no layoff policy, he might have been reluctant to come forward
with the suggestion for fear of losing his job.
In between these polar cases are a variety of plant level
responses to worker input. Most plant managers regularly meet
with foreman or lead men, discussing not only day to day
production requirements, but also seeking input from at least
these people, if not a broader group, to determine realistic
production goals. For example, one plant manager recently met
with all of the people who, it was anticipated, would be
involved in the production of a new product, to discuss the
price and delivery time he would be quoting the customer, and
to get a sense of whether his bid was realistic. This
discussion broadened into a discussion of the limitations of
existing capital equipment, and what kind of improvements
and/or new purchases could increase the plant's efficiency
and/or versatility, although no decisions were made at the
meeting to actually make a new equipment purchase. Another
company encourages worker innovation through all levels of the
company with a plant-wide monthly bonus plan, tied to the
profitability of the whole operation. In February of this
year, the bonus amounted to an extra $300 on every employees
monthly paycheck, although the average is in the $80-$100
range. All of the examples I heard that were implemented by
the companies, had to do with process rather than product
innovation. In some cases, its difficult for workers to become
involved in product innovation, because, as one worker told
me, he often does not know what exactly the end use is and in
what industries the end use is situated.
Implic at ions
While many local firms see flexibility, both in
production processes and in products, as a key ingredient in
their ability to be competitive, they are not confident that
their ability to be flexible will last as they become busier
and reduce their excess capacity. The current level of shop
floor flexibility is perceived, at least in the union shops,
as a situation borne of hard times. Likewise, the level of
inter-firm cooperation is seen as a response to hard times.
For example, one manager, interested in a joint buying service
for raw materials, said that although the idea had been
discussed at his trade association, nothing had been done
because "tirmes haven't got that hard; that's what'll take."
The companies that feel they will be able to maintain
flexibility as they grow are in the minority. The more
successful companies are reducing their intra-regional
interaction in termci of ta.ing local subcontract work in or
putting local subcontracts out.
One small company president feels that Franklin County
firms, with their skilled workforce and proximity to the high
technology belt around Boston, could successfully operate as
"job shops", taking in specialized subcontracting and repair
work. His own company does such work. For many other
companies, however. "job shop" has the negative connotation
associated with peripheral and unstable economic activity.
Those firms are pursuing long term subcontracts with a steady
set of customers.
However, whether firms are now either experimenting with
what they hope will be permanent innovations, or just riding
out bad times through forms of cooperation (interfirm and
labor-management) that are periodically revived during
economic downturns, they seem to be open to discussions about
what forms of additional cooperation make sense. Even one
firm, for example, that is running very close to capacity, is
interested in certain areas of cooperation: this particular
firm mentioned that a joint delivery service from Franklin
County to the airport would be very useful.
It's not clear to what extent any of these new strategies
will directly contribute to a substantial expansion of
metalworking jobs vs. stabilizing existing jobs, at least in
the short run (next 5 years). Three firms that I interviewed
have had a net increase in employees over the last couple of
years, and for two of those, the increase has been less than 5
people. A third company, started last year by managers from
Union-Dutter field, which closed in 1933, has hired forty
people so far, all of them) former ranagers, engineers, and
supervisors from U.B., now doing production work. This company
the fastest growing one, has a five year plan to double its
si ze.
However, the stabilization of existing firms , according
to several company presidents, is a key pre-condition for
attracting a large employer to the area, as the union
continues to want. First, it is necessary to demonstrate an
improved labor management climate; as one company official
told me "We have to learn to get along with the union, because
it hurts us and the region as a whole that we don't". Second,
the pool of people in metalworking trades must be maintained,
and skills continually upgraded, which will only happen if
potential workers perceive the existence of at least some
stable jobs. Finally, the existence of many small companies in
the region may have other agglomeration effects for a large
company moving in, e.g. good training programs, responsive
marketing channels, opportunity for local subcontracting-out
in a pinch, etc. This suggests that a flexible specialization
strategy complements in some senses the industrial recruitment
strategy originally at the heart of the MTAP project.
As discussed earlier, the agglomeration effects do not
exist primarily around explicit interindustry linkages, but
around the labor market. In this sense, a concentration on
the labor market assets of Franklin County, as MTAP is
promoting, does seem very appropriate. In fact, the nature of
changing extcrnal markets may give areaa that havc the
foundation for good interfirm networks and innovative labor
management relations a particular comparative advantage that,
until now, has not existed. Thus, it is critical for public
policy, through projects such as MTAP, to explore where
cooperation might be possible, the nature of its effects on
the region, and the possibilities for public intervention to
facilitate its development. The next section of this paper,
in analyzing the successes and bottlenecks for the MTAP
project, in part explores the potential contradictions in
pursuing a flexible specialization strategy.
LABOR AND THE EVOLUTION OF MTAP:
STRUCTURE,, STRATECGIES AND OUTCOMES
Overview
It is impossible to discuss the evolution of the MTAP
project separately from labor's role in the Franklin
County/Athol economy, because the MTAP project was initiated
by workers in response to their experiences in the regional
economy. The evolution in MTAP's structure reflects the
evolution of worker participation in the project. The
particular strategies to generate high skilled replacement
jobs for dislocated workers were initially shaped by, and then
proceeded to shape, the structure of worker participation in
MTAP.
This chapter will take a different focus from the project
evaluations that have already been done for MTAP. These
evaluations include first, the MTAP Final Report, written by
the first Project Coordinator, to chronicle the development of
MTAP's implementation strategies through various planning,
outreach, and research activities. This document highlights
how MTAP successfully involved businesspeople, workers, and
public sector representatives in defining realistic long run
strategies to create skilled jobs in metalworking. The second
evaluation, produced from meetings with workers who were
involved with MTAP, reflects disappointment that the project
did not meet their expectations around short term job
generation, nor did it successfully balance the decision-
making structure between business and labor. Workers seem to
have had a much narrower conception of economic development
strategies, focusing on attracting outside investment and new
business start-ups, than the Project Director, who explored
a wide range of strategies including those centering on work
with existing firms.
Building from these two evaluations, I will explore why a
labor-initiated committee based project evolved into more of a
one-on-one consulting service provided by staff to local
metalworking companies. Discussion will focus on how the
evolution in structure relates to the evolution in strategy.
I will first review the initial structure and goals of
MTAP, and then the two evaluations mentioned above. I will
relate each to the earlier discussions of a shift toward
flexible specialization. Additionally, I will review the
project outcomes. Second, I will describe the current
decision-making structure and strategies/activities of MTAP.
I will argue that, while the shift in strategies toward
working with existing firms makes sense, given trends in the
metalworking industries, that the structure for labor
participation is problematic.
MTAP: Initial Structure
In order to discuss strategies and outcomes, it is
necessary to understand how MTAP was structured and how its
initial goals were defined. At the beginning, a key goal was,
in fact, to create a more participatory decision-making
structure that would include labor in economic development
planning. As the experimentation with strategies shifted from
attracting outside investment to strengthening existing
Franklin County firms, the role of workers within MTAP became,
as one worker said, "secondary" and unclear.
The MTAP project idea was developed and promoted in 1983
by the two year old "Ad-Hoc Committee on Dislocated Machine
Tool Workers in Franklin County", a group that had been formed
to broadly address problems around plant closings. Coordinated
by the Franklin County Community Development Corporation
(CDC), the Committee included members of the U.E. local, the
elected state representative, the director and some Board
members of the CDC, and other public sector representatives
from, for example, the Franklin/Hampshire Employment and Training
Consortium(F/HETC)--the local office of the state Division of
Employment Security. Several of these people attended
the union hall meeting described in the introduction. That
union meeting was triggered by the discovery that the
Massachusetts state government did not consider Franklin
County's economic problems as serious enough to warrant
special attention.
In late summer of 1983, the state government was
dispersing federal monies (through Title III of the Job
Training Partnership Act) to selected regions to be used in
assisting dislocated workers. The Franklin County/Hampshire
(adjacent county to the South) area had been excluded from the
list of targeted regions. After the meeting at the union
hall, the Ad-Hoc Committee researched why the region, so
obviously in distress, had been declared ineligible for
rel ief. They discovered that the data usezd by the state to
make the allocation decision was outdated, from 1980, and did
not reflect the rash of plant closings which occurred in
Franklin County between 1980 and 1983.
While the local constituency to organize a project like
MTAP was in place, the support of key people in State
Government was critical in locating and channeling funds, and
in developing a policy framework. Michael Schippiani, who
attended the union meeting representing the state's Executive
Office of Labor, suggested that the Ad-Hoc Committee pursue
some discretionary money in the Title III budget, to use in
assisting dislocated workers. Because Title III allowed for
programs in job creation and retention, as a component of "job
search assistance", MTAP, as a project to involve workers in
planning for job creation, fit the funding criteria.
The Ad- Hoc Committee drew up the initial proposal for
MTAP, calling it the "Employment Generating Project". The
final proposal was developed cooperatively by the Executive
Office of Labor, the Executive Office of Economic Affairs,
which disbursed JTPA Title III funds, and the Franklin County
CDC. In addition to the federal money, the state contributed
its own funds as designated by 1984 Mature Industries
legislation. State and Federal funds were channeled to MTAP
through the Franklin County Private Industry Council (PIC),
which was the existing local mechanism for channeling job
training money into the county. The Franklin County CDC,
having established a working relationship with both the union
and many local businesses, was chosen by the Ad-Hoc Co'mmittee
to adm,,inister th& MTAP experiment.
The development from idea to project generated a model
for broad based cooperative planning at the local level, and
the designation of MTAP as a pilot project by the state.
Initially, at the local level, MTAP was conceived as a labor
project, a committee made up largely of dislocated workers, to
research the industry and develop revitalization strategies.
In order to coordinate public sector activities, local
representatives were included, just as they were on the Ad-Hoc
committee. In order to take advantage of managers' expertise
as a resource for this effort, participation was broadened to
include business. Thus organizers envisioned a new
cooperative working relationship within a new planning arena
between business and labor and the public sector in pursuit of
high quality jobs for the region.
A local Advisory Board of workers, managers, and public
sector people was established to oversee the project. A
separate worker's consulting committee was formed as an
exclusively workers group to guide the project and provide a
setting where workers felt comfortable giving input.
The model was formalized by the state as a Cooperative
Regional Industrial Laboratory (CRIL), program, and the state
now oversees several similarly structured projects at a much
earlier stage of development, that focus on other regionally
concentrated declining industries and their affected
workforce. A statewide CRIL advisory council, consisting of
public and private sector development experts, was established
to offer technical assistance to the CRILs.
The MTAP project was initially funded in June 1984 for a
period of six months up until December 1984; a project
coordinator was hired, and soon afterwards, an administrative
assistant and a worker outreach worker were added. Only the
worker outreach organizer was a local person; she had worked
as a secretary for the U.E. In November 1984, the Executive
Office of Labor hired a CRIL program manager to oversee the
MTAP and future CRIL projects around the state.
The initial six month funding from the state was intended
to support a two part planning process. First, MTAP would
document the needs of workers and the potential for a
revitalized regional metalworking industry. Second, MTAP would
develop a set of implementation strategies to generate new
jobs in the machine trades. After this exploratory process,
it was anticipated that financial support for MTAP could be
drawn from local sources; the businesses, union and local
public sector who had cooperatively developed plans for the
future. As the state's December 1984 monitoring report notes,
"The initial MTAP proposal assumed that its products would be
an action plan for future job creation. This plan would
include a job creation strategy and recommend possible funding
sources." Research was seen as an organizing tool that would
forge a new working relationship at the local level, and build
a constituency for local support of the project. The project
was intended to expand labor's role in public decision-making
around economic development, but not to directly address
labor-management relations within the individual firms.
As it turned out, MTAP was refunded twice by the state,
for six months from December 1984 through June 1985, and then,
after a three month gap, has a current year contract that
extends from Spetember 1985 through August 1986.
Initial Goals
What were the goals of MTAP, goals around an employment
generating project? First, its organizers wanted to bring
labor into the planning process around economic development,
as a valuable source of ideas and information, and to
legitimize labor as a participant in the public planning that
so affected workers. As one worker recalled, "We wanted to
be not just objects of policy making, but participants in
shaping economic development policy".
Second, they wanted economic development planning to
focus on options that would preserve existing, and create
additional high skilled manufacturing jobs, with the high
skilled workforce as the comparative advantage of the region.
Third, MTAP wanted to effect a coordination of economic
development planning with training/retraining for dislocated
workers, so that training would build upon the skills of the
workforce, and economic development would provide new
employment opportunities. This goal would link the MTAP
planning process with worker assistance centers for dislocated
workers, funded also by the state with Title III money. Worker
assistance centers provided a range of direct services to
workers, coordinating benefits, training, and re-employment.
The MTAP organizers were not sure what types of jobs or
industries would be feasible, but they desired a coordinatio'n
to ensure that training would build upon existing regional
skills rather than having a system of training based on
projected growth occupations of the future, regardless of how
the skill content of the new jobs related to the old.
Evaluations
The MTAP Project Final Report describes a three phase
process to develop implementation strategies, and a local
constituency around those strategies. These are called: 1) An
Inventory of Resources, 2) Laying the Strategic Foundation,
and 3) Putting Strategies to Work. This section will offer a
sample of the activites.
The first phase was dominated by a skills survey to
determine the existing skill base and re-employment
experiences of dislocated workers in the machine trades. The
survey took much longer to complete than expected, so that
other goals set out in an initial work plan had not been
completed by the end of the first funding cycle.
The survey was useful in a number of different ways.
First, it was used by the Workers Consulting Committee in
phase III to produce an illustrated skills brochure to market
the region. Workers felt the brochure was a very satisfying
and concrete project. Both the Franklin County and the Athol
Chambers of Commerce mentioned the usefulness of this data in
our conversations, and both offices displayed the brochure
along with other proriiotional material. The Athol Chamber
director especially emphasized the importance of marketing
"skill" as an regional comparative advantage: his Office in
1984 comrriissioned a study of industry SIC codes whose skill
requirements match the local workforce, as a guide for
recruiting firms into the local industrial park. MTAP staff
wrote a feature story which they sent to Industry Trade
Journals based on the survey information.
Additionally, the skills information helped the worker
assistance centers in Greenfield and Athol to be more
effective, by providing them with detailed information about
the population they served. The senior planner for the
Franklin/Hampshire Employment and Training Consortium, which
administered the worker assistance centers, noted two specific
sources of information improved service delivery.
First, because many people had never finished high school,
they had "basic skills" deficiencies. This would
seriously limit the reemployment options for these dislocated
workers. Second, the survey revealed that the dislocated
workforce contained many older workers, who would need special
assistance in finding new work.
But the surveys were not a good organizing tool. Although
twelve to fifteen workers were active on the worker
consulting committee, and workers were paid to do the survey
administering, only two workers and one worker's wife
actually administered the survey. One reason that the
administering did not involve more workers was, according to
an outreach worker, that workers felt uncomfortable asking
friends and co-workers questions that were quite personal,
i.e. inccme.
Mor eovter , t he t i me 1 ag bet ween suimmer o f 1983, wh en t he
area was in the throes of plant closings and the idea for MTAP
first came up, and the fall of 1984, was a problem. By then,
many people had found new jobs, and even if they had inferior
.jobs to their old ones (e.g. long corimmute, lower pay, less
skill), they often did not have the free time to get involved.
The sense of urgency was no longer the same. One of the
reasons the survey took so long to complete was that it was so
difficult just locating the dislocated workforce, some of whom
had been laid off for nearly a year, and were out of touch
with the union.
Other activities during the first phase include the start
of a metalworking firm survey. This survey, administered by
MTAP staff, was designed to gather information about current
plant capacity, and to publicize the MTAP project to
businesses so that they might want to get involved. Many of
the business people I interviewed, however, barely remembered
having been surveyed, and when they could remember, the most
comrimon reaction re: the purpose of MTAP, was; "It was trying
to find jobs for workers who were laid off during the plant
closings. But since we weren't expanding, we couldn't really
helpand couldn't see how the project could help us."
Nevertheless, based on the survey responses, MTAP did invite a
few local businesspeople to sit on the MTAP Local Advisory
Board, and tried to engage them in disussions about their own
business strategies with respect to the generation of high
skill jobs. The meeting minutes reveal that while a number of
comapny presidents or plant managers attended one or two
mevetings, nobsnsspol-atneio eulrbss
Thus, development of a working relationship between business
and labor was not happening initially. This reflects that the
role of business at the beginning was ill-defined: to assist
in job generation, either in one's own firm, or in "the
c ommun i t y".
MTAP also conducted other research. Workers and staff
researched trends within the cutting tool industry and related
metalworking activities, and investigated the feasibility of
particular product markets. For example, more than one meeting
included discussion of a potential market for specialized
equipment for handicapped people. Literature from labor-
led product development within individual firms, such as Lucas
Aerospace and Hyatt-Clark Industries, focused the discussion.
Basically, the first phase focused on information
gathering. In phase two, the information was used to explore
strategies, and influence activity outside of the MTAP
committee structure itself. From the skills survey, in
addition to the skills brochure, the Advisory Board came up
with the idea of having worker representatives integrated into
the industrial recruitment activities of local economic
development organizations. The Westmass Development
Corporation, the development arm of the Franklin County
Chamber of Commerce, and the Athol/Orange Industrial
Development Corporation, development arm of the Athol Chamber
of Commerce, agreed to invite worker representatives to
meetings with prospective businesses that might need machining
skills.
The regional economy had a potential liability in its
"poor business cliimate" as a result of perceived labor
militancy and business intransigence. To remedy this, a
retired union worker and the director of Industrial relations
at a large cutting tool plant, with the support of MTAP,
sponsored a community meeting to take up practical issues of
common concern to business and labor. Called the Industrial
Base Council (IBC), this one meeting was followed up by a
number of others around the issue of health care cost
containment. The IBC attracted primarily managers and workers
from the larger companies, both union and non-union, both
metalworking and other types of manufacturing and service.
To follow up on the product develo 'pment idea, and
emulating the Hyatt-Clark experience, two "brainstorming"
sessions were held, one with workers and one with management,
to generate a list of new product ideas. Only managers who
were umriemployed, retired, or employed in non-metal working were
invited to the sessions. Because ownership of the ideas was
unclear, however, and concrete markets were not identified,
the initial sessions were not followed up.
Another strategy for new product development was to work
with interested local businesses to help them evaluate
potential market opportunities. This began in Phase III, and
the adoption of this strategy was controversial. As the
report diplomatically notes:
The most active discussion focused on whether internal (to
the region) development was a priority over external
development (frorrm outside the region). While the intent
of the discussion was not to select one or the other
di r tion, no resol ut i on was r - achIed on which st r at y
should be emphasized on the basis that it would be most
beneficial for the community over the long run."
Phase III resulted in the three prong implementation
recomendation strategy that was described in the introduction.
First, it recommended targeting local businesses interested in
product diversification with concentrated technical
assistance. Selected businesses would have to meet MTAP
criteria around issues such as expected employment generation
effect, history of labor-management relations, etc.
Second, it recommended continued marketing of the
region's skills in a number a ways. Along with straight
marketing to firms that might be relocating physically, other
strategies to attract outside investment capital, such as
joint ventures and subcontracting for existing firms, were
recommended. This particular recommendation emphasized the
role of various state agencies, such as Commerce and
Development and International Trade, in supporting the
marketing efforts.
Third, it recommended increased assistance to small
businesses as a potential source of new jobs. Together, these
strategies are drifting toward not only working with existing
businesses, but also toward working with them in a way that
encourages flexible specialization. Still at the center of
these strategeis is the issue of skilled jobs, but now the
focus is on increasing the competitiveness of existing firms
rather than on importing skilled jobs from wherever possible.
In addition to these recommendations, MTAP sponsored a
conference, "What Do You Do When the Plant Shuts Down?", in
June of 1985, to bring together the project's participants.
Around the time of this conference, members of the
Workers Consulting Committee came together for their own
evaluation of the MTAP Project. My interviews with workers
yielded the same kind of results as the evaluation notes. To
sum, there is much ambivalency on the part of workers toward
the project. The most repeated phrase I heard was that "Well,
it didn't really meet my expectations, but then, maybe our
expectations were too high." While no one regreted having been
involved, many felt that the project had not lived up to its
potential.
The gradual withering of labor involvement in
the MTAP project reflects, in part, worker discouragement that
MTAP has fallen short of their expectations for job creation.
This "Employment Generating "project was charged with creating
four hundred jobs to fill the gap left by plant closings, and
certainly MTAP has not been able to do this. The lack of labor
satisfaction also, however, reflects the local union
leadership's dissatisfaction with some of MTAP's strategies to
work with existing local businesses around flexible
specialization. Moreover, even if the local union agreed with
MTAP's strategies, it is not clear what kind of role workers
can play, given MTAP's structure for worker involvement.
When MTAP was set up initially, the structure of worker
participation suited a strategy to recruit outside investment.
There was no particular need to develop a working relationship
with local businesses. A worker committee could conduct
research, chase down leads of firms that were consideYing
expansion, and prepare promotional material. In fact, this is
what the Worker Consulting Committee initially did, acting as
a worker Chamber of Commerce to market the region. It is
critical to keep in mind that labor, from the beginning, saw
MTAP as focused on job recruitment and worker entrepreneurship
almost exclusively. As one worker said, "the basic idea was
to draw new industry to the area, and new jobs into the area."
The brochure was a tool for job recruitment: the product
diversification work was adopted as a means of identifying
opportunities for worker entrepreneurs.
As the MTAP strategy moved away from attracting outside
imvestment and toward working directly with local businesses,
the role of MTAP as a forum for business labor cooperation,
grew more complicated. How were union committee members and
non-union firm managers supposed to work together? Where did
the non-union workforce of many of these firms fit in? Even
when a particular business had a union, how was it to work
with a committee of union members from a wide range of firms?
What exactly was the role of MTAP? Where should it be trying
to influence the development of working relationships, and
how?--in the public planning arena, within individual firms,
in the MTAP decision making structure?
The shift toward working more closely with existing firms
has been seen by some workers as a "loss in focus"; they felt
that the outside marketing strategy was abandoned prematurely.
As well, they have little history of contact, to say nothing
-.--f a w'orking relationship, with rmny of the existing firms,
which do not have a uni on. Additional ly, the hi ft toward
working together, and establishing a new basis for
relationships with businesses to generate new jobs, vs.
attracting businesses and then setting up a familiar
collective bargaining relationship, means that the union must
enter unfamiliar and suspect territory. Not only are they
skeptical that exisiting businesses will generate a
significant number of jobs, but also they sense that a move
toward flexible specialization can undermine the power of the
union.
The union's negative position on flexibility in the
workplace comes out of both local experience with firms, and
the U.E.'s broad national philosophy. With respect to local
experience, one often repeated story is the story of Millers
Falls Tool (see also Goodman, p. 29). In 1962, the locally
owned ccmpany was bought by a corporation, Ingersoll Rand.
While, in the 1950's, employment at Millaers Falls had been as
high as 1300 workers, by 1976, employment levels had shrunk
across the industry, and in this particular firm fdown to
shrunk to 650 workers. In 1976, the coripany announced that it
was considering moving south to build a newer, modern plant.
The State and the town of Deerfield put together an
attractive financial package for Ingersoll Rand to build in
Franklin County. As well, the union, after several months of
resistance, agreed to very small or no wage increases over the
next four years, and changes in work: rules that would make the
shcp floor iore flexible. These changes included temporary
transfers on the shop floor and a modified seniority system.
A new plant was built., and Ingersoll Rand moved from
Greenfield one town south to Deerfield, keeping basically the
same workers. Employment continued to decline in the new
place, and, with very little notice, Ingersoll Rand sold the
plant, and laid the workforce off. One of the workers learned
in a late night telephone call from his family while he was on
vacation, that that, as of the end of the week, he would be
unemployed. The concessionary contract did not really keep
those jobs secure. The new owners, Rule Industries, hired back
about half of the fired workers, and in a matter of weeks
after the plant reopened, the union was decertified.
According to the field organizer for the U.E., experiences
like this have convinced workers that "the best contract is
the most rigid contract" and that all attempts by management to
increase flexibility on the shop floor represent concessions
by workers. As one worker told me, "it's not usually an
efficiency problem that drives managers to seek increased
shop floor flexibility; it is that they simply don't want to
go through the process of the rules, they don't want to be
bothered".
As well, this particular union has a reputation for being
a "hard-line union:" as one Greenfield worker told me, "we're
the militant ones." The national union does not acknowledge
any confluence of interests between labor and managers
(capital); hence, labor-management cooperation of any form
cannot benefit labor.
Outcomes
There is some disagreement within the local as to both
the merits of MTAP and the larger question about the
possibilities, or the necessity, for labor-management
cooperation. As one worker sighed "We're stuck--they're the
ones that have the bucks." Workers do point to some successes
with MTAP, but these are in the public planning arena more
than in relationships with managers.
For example, one worker in Athol has begun to be invited
to Chamber of Commerce meetings as a worker representative.
Another worker says that when he attends town meetings around
economic development in Greenfield, he now feels like he is a
legitimate participant in discussions rather than a tolerated
nuisance.
MTAP seems to have had some ameliorating effects on the
polarization between labor and management in the community, so
that discussions of hardships facing the workforce and
possible strategies for remedying the situation could take
place for the first time. Since TRW, the parent corporation of
Greenfield Tap and Die (Greenfield's largest employer),
announced that it was selling its local plant, the union has
received broad-based support from local retail businesses and
town officials in a campaign to keep the plant open. Signs
proclaiming "GTD Belongs in Greenfield" are plastered all over
town, and the U.E. has been instrumental in organizing a GTD
Task Force that involves both the public and private sectors.
This situation is in sharp contrast to the case of Bendix
(now Besly), which was similarly divested by the Allied
Corporation in 1983. In that case, the town did not play such
an active role, and while employees within the plant did
approach the town for support, they did not find it, according
to a Bendix worker, either within town government, the U.E.
local as a whole, or the community at large. Although
everyone I spoke to had a different prediction of the outcome
of this newly united effort around GTD, and many people are
still not sure how to affect the decision, or whether the
situation is a crisis, it is promising to see the community
begin to come together on this issue.
Finally, there is the Industrial Base Council. Although
this new organization has no concrete accomplishments, and has
faltered in the beginning, the fact that it exists at all is
significant, because it has a unique participation structure.
Each company that has become involved has agreed to send both
a worker and a manager to the same meetings. This structure
signifies an attempt to integrate business and labor
discussions both at the level of the public planning arena,
and at the level of the individual firm.
There are also successes related to business' role in the
economy. For some businesses, the impression of the U.E.
union may have improved; one company president told me, "In
the MTAP setting, some of them were more reasonable, and we at
least could talk with each other," while another manager
related that "this local is pretty good because they don't
always follow the national union position, which, in my
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opinion, undercuts their own interests. They think for
themselves." Most union members I spoke with, however, did not
significantly change their opinion of management; as one said
"they only get involved when they think there's something in
it for them." Nonunion workers were not involved in MTAP, in
part because of the difficulties in getting information about
them, and to them. However, the IBC has potential to bring
nonunion workers into these discussions.
MTAP has also been able to assist several firms as they
experiment with new strategies of marketing, product
development, or production processes, around flexible
specialization. Three examples follow.
First, through cold research of subcontracting
opportunities in growing Eastern Massachusetts companies, MTAP
staff uncovered a lead and passed it on to a local company
president who runs a small job shop and prototype
manufacturing operation. The president followed up on this
lead, and landed a contract that he expects will account for
five percent of his sales, and will result in a long term
business relationship. This is an example of finding a market
for a firm with given production capabilities, and even though
this is a fast growing company, its needs are analogous to the
situation facing many firms in declining or stable markets.
The resulting employment opportunities will probably be
delayed, since this is a new small business.
Second, MTAP is currently working with a paper machinery
manufacturer to find funds and sources of technical assistance
for the firm in developing a new version of its main product,
a pulp grinder. In less than a month, the MTAP project
director connected the company with a source of technical
assistance, and continues to search for funding. This is an
example of finding resources for product development for a
known market, that will stabilize existing jobs that may now
be in jeopardy.
Third, the president of a specialty cutting tool company
employing thirty people, responded last spring with interest
to an MTAP survey on product diversification. This company is
relatively healthy, and a majority of its products are
"specials". As an experiment, and because this company agreed
to meet certain MTAP goals, the project brought together a
group of industry experts from across the country to
brainstorm on particular product diversification opportunities
for hypothetical "Company X" with the characteristics of this
real Franklin County firm.
The president, while saying that this study was helpful,
found the proposals too general (i.e. didn't tell him how to
do a,b,and c; rather told him what to do) nor were specific
markets, with specific customers who had names and phone
numbers to contact, identified. MTAP is continuing to work
with him to refine the product diversification ideas.
Despite not gaining anything concrete from his
participation in the product diversification scheme, this
company worked again with MTAP to establish an international
joint venture. The president had in mind a joint
manufacturing venture, so that he could create more jobs in
this plant vs. a licensing agreement, where he would market a
product manufactured abroad under his brand name. He had some
experience with international markets alone, and MTAP
connected him with the State Office of International Trade,
who in turn, referred him to several foreign firms. The most
enthusiastic response came from an Israeli firm which, it
turned out, was interested only in a licensing agreement to
gain access to U.S., not a joint manufacturing venture. The
company president decided to turn down the opportunity.
There were two reasons: first, an expansion of skilled
jobs seems to be part of his strategic planning, as he moves
toward even more production of specials, and this particular
deal would not contribute to that goal. Second, he felt a
responsibility to the MTAP project, although he told me this
with a strong caveat: "If my business wasn't going this well,
I don't think I'd have given the guy the cold shoulder. And
if my business declines, I may have to go that route just to
stay afloat." This example shows that a business can stand the
uncertainty of an experimental project, and still maintain
their involvement.
68
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
The state has been very concerned that there be concrete
outcomes, especially in number of jobs created or stabilized.
This, in fact, is the type of evaluation that was initially
suggested to me. In part, the state must be concerned with
tangible results because much of the money that funds MTAP,
the federal Title III money, is earmarked for job training and
placement policy. The evaluation systems use concrete measures
such as number of job placements, not the kind of outcomes
which MTAP exhibits e.g. "a cooperative decisionmaking
structure". To the extent that MTAP enhances the ability of
direct service agencies such as the Worker Assistance Centers,
to respond more helpfuly to worker needs, as a result of the
skills survey knowledge, then MTAP may have some indirect
effect on the placement rate. The strength of programs like
MTAP, however, is probably not its job creation potential in
the short run. Rather, it is in influencing the decision-
making structure around public economic development planning
and private strategic choices, influencing those decisions
toward long term employment generation.
The particular focus of MTAP is in linking busiess
strategies with overall regional job creation, and creation of
quality, stable jobs. So MTAP does not want to be in the
position of exclusively consulting with businesses on their own
terms, but rather attempting to link business self interest
with broader goals. I found that firms, both when doing well
and when doing poorly, were interested in experimentation. I
consideration of the openness of firms to cooperating, and of
the market demands facing metalworking firms in Franklin
County, I would make the following recommendations for
fruitful MTAP activity.
A. RECOMMIT MTAP TO WORKERS WITH A TRADE SHOW AROUND THE
SKILLS AND PRODUCTIVE CAPACITY OF FRANKLIN COUNTY.
Organize a trade show of sorts, on the theme "If it's made
of Metal, we can do it for you", and recruit New England
Companies that respond to the new Marketing Cordinator 's
initial inquiries about suncontracting oppcrtunities that have
just begun. Each company could set up displays, explain
production processes, and meet real people to contact back.
One might consider holding the trade show inEastern Mass. to
increase.the participation of possible customers. Such a
meeting could be prefaced by a meeting of Franklin County
businesses to discuss joint venture capabilities and shared
service potential informally-- these potentials could be
offered as an additional element of flexibility within the
region's industry. Representatives of the union could set up a
booth as well, or workers and managers from each firm could
set up joint displays. It cannot hurt the project to focus on
marketing to outside investors, whether subcontracting, joint
ventures, or physical relocation. This marketing effort may
bring the labor union back into the MTAP decisionmaking
structure. Perhaps the experience of seeking out footloose
plants may cause workers to eventually reassess the currently
rejected "growth from within" strategy.
B.USE PUBLIC POLICY TO PUSH EXISTING PRIVATE MECHANISMS TO
WORK BETTER THAN SETTING UP A PARALLEL PRIVATE STRUCTURE
without the expertise. Figure out how a particular behavior
goes on already in the private sector: what makes it succeed?
what makes it fail? For example, I have examined the role of
industrial distributors and marketing strategies in
facilitating or hindering new product development. Determine
to what extent area firms rely on the same industrial
distributors to market their products. Organiza a meeting of
ncon-competing industries (of which there are many) tco discuss
forming a Franklin County/Athol "block of influence" with the
distributors. Then, firms as a group could meet with their
shared distributors to work out ways of increasing customer-
supplier interaction and penetration of new markets through
the existing distribution network. Many firms have told me
they do this individually with their distributors, but when
that distributor carries many product lines, it is difficult
to get the distributor to pay attention to any particular one.
Rather, the commission paid on the sale gets the distributors
attention. A block of firms, howverm representing a large
number of product lines that together bring in a substantial
amount of business to the distributor, may elicit more
responsiveness and effectiveness. The meeting of firms around
this issue could evaluate how flexible the industrial
distribution network is and has the potential to be, and
whether it meets their needs as they focus on new market
opportunities, which have perhaps certain new characteristics.
Might other marketing strategies by needed to complement this
method, and if so, could any aspects of new methods be done
more effectively if done cooperatively?
C. LAY THE GROUNDWORK FOR INFORMAL DEBATE AT THE FIRM LEVEL
AND AT THE I.B.C.
Most every firm I spoke with had developed
particular expertise in at least one element of flexible
specialization. For example, sor,,e firms are recognized, both
by other firms and by workers, as being especially good with
labor-management relations, and have been able to gain
flexibility in their production processes through more
efficient use of the workforce. I can think of four firms, two
union and two ncn-union, that would be especially appropriate.
Likewise, other local firms have expertise in soliciting
worker input that proves profitable; in marketing, be it
through industrial distributors or through other channels;
assessment of appropriate technologies for particular
production needs and the integration of new technology piece
by piece into a plant; product diversification, and the
location of resources and for development and customers.
There may be other areas as well.
It would be useful, I think, to organize either a conference
at which all these ideas were discusses, or a set of one-shot
meetings (dinners?) where these issues could be considered one
at a time. The advantage of doing the series all at once is
that a wrap-up could focus can to what extent and exactly how
these issues relate to each other in determining a firm's
success. The disadvantage is that perhaps no one issue would
be treated in enough depth to be useful for the participants.
Additionally, it would be useful for workers from what are
regarded as successful plants dealing with the same sets of
issues to lead parallel discussions about these issues from
the point of view of the workforce, and similarly have a wrap-
up discussion where they assess how the various issues relate
to the quality and stability of their jobs.
After each set of discussions happens, drawing on local
expertise, workers and managers could come together at the
firm level to discuss their reactions and ideas, and perhaps
again across firms to compare the usefulness of various
approaches. Perhaps at such a meeting, management and worker
representatives from metalworking coripanies, both union and
non-utni on, in other places, could be invited to describe their
situations, how they became successful, where the difficult
decisions lay, where there is still disagreement, and to give
feedback on local initiatives.
D.BUILD THE INDUSTRIAL BASE COUNCIL, BUT CONTINUE TO HAVE AN
ORGANIZATION LIKE MTAP TO CLARIFY THE DEBATE.
Continue exploring the Industrial Base Council as a structure
for a public forum for workers and managers, and explore the
kinds of discussions that make managers and workers want to
coimmunicate better at the firm leveltry to draw that link.
But also keep in mind that the I.B.C. is not particularly
attractive to smaller businesses, who told me that the
meetings, revealing the institutional rigidity of big
companies and tightly organized unions, resemble a couple of
dinosaurs in a boxing ring. These small firms are not likely
to participate in this forum, at least initially.
V. FIND A SOURCE OF FUNDING TO CONTINUE SUPPORTING MTAP;
The kinds of goals that MTAP has are still employment
generating goals, but they are long term goals. A review of
area labormanagement committees (Warner, Meek, and Whyte,1985)
reveals that most take three to five years before generating
enough visibility to ensure a local funding base. The industry
goals also are long term goals: to stabilize existing jobs
first. While it makes sense that JTPA money is probably not
appropriate for a program with this kind of a timeline, MTAP
is a key element of ecocnomic development that starts "from the
bottom up" and accurately can identify the places in a local
economy where intervention is li kely to have an impact. Some
sort of bridge money must be located to fund MTAP between its
initial JTPA grant, and its adoption by the region as an
internally funded institution.
"From any fruition of success,
no matter what,
Shall come forth something
To make a greater struggle necessary."
-Walt Whitman
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INTERVIEWS
Bill Benson, former state representative from Greenfield
Dee DiTerlizzi, Director, Business Development,
Massachusetts Dept. of Commerce
Mike Schippiani, Assistant Secretary,
Massachusetts Executive Office of Labor
Sue Pratt, Business Developer, MTAP, former MTAP outreach
coordinator, and secretary of U.E. Local 276.
Maggie Striebel, current project director, MTAP.
Deb Gaines, former project director, MTAP
Gerry Joseph, Executive Director, Franklin County
Community Development COrporation
Tom Kussy, Director, Athol/Orange Chamber of Commerce and
Industrial Development Corporation
Ann Hamilton, Director, Franklin County Chamber of Commerce
Jack Clark, CRIL Program manager, Mass. Exec. Office of Labor
Breck Balmos, Program Manager, Mass, Industrial Services
Program, former union steward, Union Butterfield, and
director of Worker Assistance Center.
Woody Brown, Marketing Coordinator, MTAP. Member MTAP Advisory
Board, former outreach worker for dislocated workers
Carl Bittenbender, former director, Athol/Orange Chamber of
Commerce
Jim Parcells, senior planner, Franklin County Employment and
Training Consortium.
Joe Hicks, retired union leader, Bendix. Currently employee of
MTAP coordinating outreach to workers, Active in MTAP.
Jim Greene, U.E. Local 276 President, vice-chairman,
Greenfield Tap and Die
Al Targhetta, U.E. Chairman, Greenfield Tap and Die
Peter Knowlton, FIeld organizer, U.E. Local 276
Jerry Lavelley, steward, Greenfield Tap and Die
Gary Dillonsneider, union treasurer, Besly Product Corporation
(formerly Bendix). Active in MTAP
Judy Ruff, former president, U.E. Local 276. Worked at
Ingersoll Rand. Active in MTAP.
Bill Cain, chairman, decertified shop at Rule Industries
(formerly Ingersoll Rand), Active in MTAP
Rick Hannon, worker, Bendix and Greenfield Tap and Die, Active
in MTAP.
Charlie Sharpe, vice-president, Peterson Tool Co, Nashville,
Tennessee
Richard O'Hearn, president, The Waite Co, industrial
distributor
Charles Houston, executive vice-president, Industrial Supplies
of Worcester
Alex Markley, Director, Industrial Relations, Greenfield Tap
and Die, former field organizer, U.E. Local 276.
Bill Cummins, Personnel Director and Assistant Plant Manager,
Rule Industries, S. Deerfield
Jim Peters, Comptroller, Greenfield Tap and Die,
Director, Franklin County Private Industry Council,
on MTAP Advisory Board
Peter Elliot, president, DuMont Industries, Greenfield
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Interviews, cont.
John Lawless,, president, Mayhew Steel Products, Inc. Buckland
Doug Wright, plant manager, Besley Products Corp, Greenfield
Cody Sisson, president, Sisson Engineering, Northfield
David Bete., president, Bete Fog Nozzle, Greenfield
Tom Rogers, vice president, manufacturing, Montague Machine
Co, Turners Falls
Jay Pierce, president, Montague Machine Co, Turners Falls
John Holsten, president, Athol Cutter and Carbide, Athol
Chuck McCarthy,. president, Greenfield Steel Stamp and Tool
Jack Saunders, marketing director, Lamson and Goodnow,
Shelburne Falls
Bob Collen, vice president, personnel, Rodney Hunt Co, Orange
Jay Padgug, president, North American Carbide, Greenfield.
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